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Abstrak
Indo-Pasifik merupakan salah satu kawasan yang paling dikontestasikan selama satu dekade terakhir.
Setelah Cina menunjukkan tujuan ambisiusnya dalam menghidupkan kembali jalan sutera melalui
kehadiran ekonomi dan militernya, Amerika Serikat, India, Jepang dan Australia membentuk koalisi
baru untuk melawan strategi ini. Tulisan ini bertujuan untuk melihat posisi Indonesia sebagai
kekuatan maritim tradisional di kawasan dalam konteks perubahan lanskap maritim kawasan Indo
Pasifik. Dalam penelitiannya, Tulisan ini mengembangkan konsep “tiga wajah kekuatan maritim”
yang membedakan kekuatan maritim menjadi “hard”, ”soft”, dan ”normatif”. Temuan tulisan ini
menunjukkan bahwa Indonesia kurang menunjukkan “hard” dan “soft” power-nya, namun lebih
mengandalkan kekuatan normatif untuk menunjukkan kehadirannya di lanskap maritim yang baru di
Indo Pasifik.

Kata kunci:
Indonesia, kekuatan maritim, Indo Pasifik, “tiga wajah kekuatan maritim”

Abstract
Indo-Pacific has been among the most contested regions in the past decade. After China demonstrated
its ambitious goal in reviving maritime silk road with its military and economic presence, United
States, India, Japan, and Australia formed a new coalition to counter this strategy. This paper aims
to examine the position of Indonesia as a traditional regional maritime power in the context of this
changing maritime landscape of the Indo-Pacific region. In doing so, this paper develops the concept
of “the three faces of maritime power” which distinguishes maritime power into hard, soft, and
normative maritime power. The findings of this paper indicates that Indonesia demonstrates less of its
hard and soft power, but it capitalizes on its normative power to demonstrate its presence in the new
maritime landscape of the Indo Pacific.
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INTRODUCTION
Indo Pacific is a relatively new term in international relations. However, it draws much
attention both within academic and decision-making circles given its centrality as the new
front for big power rivalry amid China’s growing influence economically and militarily.
The rise of China as the second biggest economy in the world requires China to safeguard
the continuity of the supply of hydrocarbon resources as the engine of growth for its
industry. Thus, not only that China needs to secure the resource itself, but it also has to
secure the sea lanes transporting these resources to China (Malik, 2014). Two decades
ago, China still focused mainly on the East Sea and the South China Sea or referred to as
the Western Pacific. The last decade, however, has demonstrated China’s more salient
presence far west to the Indian Ocean (Malik, 2014; Xinhua, 2015).
China’s growing presence in this Indian Ocean has unavoidably raised concerns
among other states. The most overt response is perhaps from Japan and India as direct
neighbours to China who at the same time also have historical animosity with China.
Japan and India’s bilateral meeting in October 2006 resulted in an agreed perspective that
the centre of gravity of maritime affairs has shifted from the Asia Pacific to the Indian
and the Pacific Ocean as seen by the increasing trade activities in these two oceans which
currently accounts for more than 60% of the total maritime trade (Malik, 2014). Thus, it
is important to treat both areas as an integral region, the Indo-Pacific.
Since this emergence of the new geopolitical construct, there has been a new level
of complexity in the maritime landscape in this region. With China’s increasing presence
in the Indian Ocean, the US has also indicated its support with the new geopolitical
construct. The US as an outside power often has limitation in influencing regional
dynamics both in various disputes where China insists for no intervention and bilateral
solutions and various regional mechanisms involving within-region states only. At this
point, the US benefits from the new geopolitical construct as it is broader to include the
“Pacific” where the US has been traditionally acknowledged as the Pacific power, and
Japan has even made it clear that it includes the US and Australia (Aso, 2017). In fact,
Australia was among the strongest supporter of the Indo Pacific because in the existing
regional arrangement, Australia has been also excluded from various regional
mechanisms. Interestingly, Japan, India, the US, and Australia then formed a new
coalition under Quadrilateral Security Dialogue or the Quad. One could conclude
therefore, that the new Indo-Pacific region is a very dynamic region where cooperation
and competition among states are fluid and complex.
2
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One interesting point arising from this changing maritime landscape in the region
is then how to position Indonesia as the traditional maritime state in the region vis-à-vis
these other powers. While Indo Pacific covers both the Indian and Pacific Oceans,
Southeast Asia, or Indonesia to be precise, is geographically at the heart of this region.
Indonesia is the maritime state having three critical chokepoints as the gateway for any
vessels passing Southeast Asian sea lanes to East Asia or the other way around. With
17,502 islands, Indonesia is also the largest archipelagic state in the world. Seen from
Morgenthau’s natural elements of national power as consisting of geography, resources,
and population, therefore, Indonesia is categorically a natural maritime power. Moreover,
Indonesia has also demonstrated its active participation in shaping global maritime
governance as apparent in its role in the UNCLOS processes and its active participation
in regional maritime affairs (Djalal, 1979; Kusumaatmadja, 1978). Indonesia, in short, is
not only a maritime state, but a significant maritime player in the region. However, with
other powers coming to reshape the power relations as mentioned earlier, there is a big
question on how to position Indonesia in this context.
This paper aims to contribute to this discussion as the existing literature on the
Indo Pacific focuses mainly on the big power rivalry between China and the Quad. As a
consequence, this approach has seen the Indo Pacific in a very narrow lens and it treats
the region – Southeast Asia - as passive spectators of this rivalry. In this regard, the
purpose of this paper is two folds. First, it aims to examine the power relations in the
region more comprehensively to include regional states in Southeast Asia, especially
Indonesia, and to demonstrate that regional states also have agency role in shaping
regional dynamics. And secondly, it aims to better understand Indonesia’s maritime
power in the middle of these changes. There is continuous discourse within Indonesian
public to “revive” Indonesia’s maritime power rooted in the past glory of Srivijaya and
Majapahit as maritime empires during their period (See for example Marsetio, 2018).
However, little has been explored to understand Indonesia’s maritime power, such as
whether Indonesia is indeed a maritime power, what kind of maritime power Indonesia
is, and how it is compared to other.
Thus, as the current Indonesia’s government also envisions the country to be the
Global Maritime Fulcrum, and there has been also international discussion on the rising
profile of Indonesia in the international affairs (See Tamara, 2009; Reid, 2012; Pertiwi,
2014; Acharya, 2015), this paper aims to contribute to clarify the matter in the context of
the changing Indo Pacific. The main problem in achieving all these purposes, however, is
3
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that the concept of maritime power as the main subject of discussion, is also
underdeveloped. Therefore, this paper will first delve into the existing concept of
maritime power and proposed a reconceptualization of it before it examines the case of
Indonesia.

ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK
The concept of maritime power is not only underdeveloped but also rooted in one
dominant source of literature i.e. Alfred Tayer Mahan’s seminal work entitled “The
Influence of Sea Power Upon History, 1660 – 1780” (Mahan, 1987). Written in 1899, this
work proposed an argument on the importance of control over the sea to the power of a
state. Mahan (1987, p.14) interestingly mentioned that what makes sea becomes political
is that for some and other reasons, people “choose certain lines of travel rather than the
other” or what we refer to as the trade route. In this context, control over the sea equals
with control over the sea lanes. Given the nature of sea travel as long and vulnerable from
various threats, it is important for states to control directly or indirectly, through
cooperation with transit states, the strategic points along this sea lane (Mahan, 1987,
p.15). Defined in this way, Mahan then made his second argument that control over the
sea could be acquired through naval power.
Even when he proposed the six factors influencing the sea power, Mahan thought
of these factors in relations to naval strategy. These factors are “geographical position”,
“physical conformation”, “extent of territory”, “number of populations”, “character of the
people”, and “character of the government” (Mahan, 1987, p.14-26). In relations to
geographical position, for example, Mahan argued that there are several favourable
geographical positions for maximizing its naval strategy. This position, however, could
only be capitalised only if states has control over these areas. Similar cases also apply in
relations to physical conformation. States with broader coastline and numerous ports to
interact with the outside world have more advantage than others who do not. This,
however, must be balanced with state’s ability to defend it. Other physical conformation
that matter are natural production and climate, in which Mahan argues that poor natural
production and unfriendly climate have surprisingly proven to be the push factors for
states to develop its “spirit of exploration” at the sea (Mahan, 1987, p. 19). Finally, the
last element of sea power is the extent of its territory which he defines as the extent of a
state’s coastline. This natural factor, too, must be supported by sufficient number of
seamen for its defence (Mahan, 1987, p.21).
4
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But nature is only part of the equation for Mahan. Human factor is no less
important even though again, it is still related to the ability to build a strong naval power.
Mahan argued that the number of population is important to defend the extant territory as
“staying power”. Yet, he emphasizes that the most important is those “readily available
for employment on ship” (Mahan, 1987, p.23). Interestingly, Mahan also took into
account the character of people and the character of the government as the last factor that
must be counted. The government policies on ocean development is critical in supporting
state’s vision as a sea power. But the character of the people, that is how the seamen seek
benefits on sea must also be counted. This is an interesting point as Mahan focused on
naval power but he also took into account the “morale” of its people as well as norms and
regulations set by the government as an element of sea power.
Based on this explanation, there are several points from Mahan’s sea power
concept that could be noted for the theoretical development of maritime power. First,
Mahan has offered a definition of sea power as a state that has control over the sea lanes.
This definition, even though interesting, is based on his observation during his period,
which might be insufficient to the current context. During Mahan’s period, states could
only claim three-mile territorial waters, thus control over the sea implied control
“overseas”. In the current context, however, states have extended territorial waters of up
to 12nm, Exclusive Economic Zone over 200nm, and continental shelf of up to 350nm.
This implies that states must also demonstrate its control over these surrounding waters.
Activities at the sea in this context is not only limited to trade but also include economic
exploitation on these waters. The concept of sea power in the current context, therefore,
could be redefined to include a state that has control not only over the sea lanes but also
the surrounding waters.
The second important point is the six indicators of the sea power. These elements
are comprehensive. However, they are given, implying that sea power is a matter of being
and not becoming. States who do not have such natural and human quality will never be
a sea power, and vice versa. Seen from a constructivist perspective, therefore, this paper
cautiously adopts Mahan’s elements of sea power more as elements of potential maritime
power that state could capitalize, yet, their actual maritime power will still depend on
other elements. However, it is in this regards that this paper also departs from Mahan’s
third argument that this other element refers to naval power. Naval power is undeniably
important. However, it could be problematic if it is treated equal to maritime power.
Mahan himself consistently treated naval power in defensive function of their territory.
5
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Mahan clearly stated that control over the sea lanes could also be done indirectly through
cooperation with other states. In this regard, Mahan opened the possibility for noncoercion approach to maritime power.
Finally, Mahan’s focus on naval power is based on his observation on states’
practice during his period when international law was not well established. This is
different in the contemporary era where international law and norms have abolished
territorial expansion and have regulated the use of force. Globalization with its highly
economic interdependence has also made war costly. There is limitation, in short, of naval
power to be the only element of maritime power in the contemporary era. There are
various cases that illustrate this phenomenon. Indonesia after its independence protected
its territorial integrity not by developing its naval power, but by promoting a new
international norm of “archipelagic state” which treats waters between islands as an
integral part of its territory. On the contrary, the South China disputes illustrate how big
naval powers such as China cannot win its claim against its smaller neighbours and the
United States as the biggest naval power in the world cannot effectively influence other
states to follow international law as it is also not part of the UNCLOS. These examples
demonstrate the importance of norms as new sources of power in maritime affairs.
Against this backdrop, there is an urgency to re-conceptualize maritime power to
meet the contemporary challenges. Building upon Mahan’s work, Geoffrey Till (2009)
developed the concept of sea power as to have two aspects, i.e. input and output. Sea
power as an input consists of resources that could generate power in the maritime sphere
which for Till is also mainly derived from the naval power. Yet, he argued that this naval
power must be supported by six constituents which consist of population, society, and
government; geography; technology; resources; maritime economy and other means.
While some of these constituents are similar with Mahan’s six elements of power, it
differs in that it gives importance to economic sources for naval development. The second
aspect of sea power is as an output. Here it is defined as “the capacity to influence the
behaviour of other people or things by what one does at or from the sea” (Till 2009, 21).
It is at this point that Till departed from Mahan as he did not limit the main role of sea
power only for the command of the sea, but also expeditionary operations, naval
diplomacy, and maintaining good order at sea. In short, Till expanded maritime power to
include both hard and soft power.
Building on this work, therefore, reconceptualizing maritime power might need
to revisit the basic concept of power itself. Joseph Nye has developed the concept of
6
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power consisting of the three faces of power (Nye, 2004; Nye, 2011). The first face of
power is the ability to make others do contrary to his initial preference. The second face
of power is the ability to frame/limit others’ option in line with one’s preference. The
third face of power is the ability to shape others’ initial preferences so that it is in line
with one’s preference. Nye argues that both hard power and soft power could be employed
in each face of power. Hard power refers to the use of coercion both in terms of rewards
and punishment. In the context of maritime power, it includes the use of coercion at/from
the sea to influence others’ behaviour such as the use of naval power to take over sea lane,
conquer territory, or exploit maritime resources. Meanwhile, soft power refers to the use
of persuasion or attraction such as ideologies, culture, and economic advantages.
Translated to the maritime context, following Till, it will include the use of
persuasion/attraction at/from the sea to influence other. China’s attraction through its Belt
and Road Initiative is one example of China’s soft power in influencing maritime
development in other countries.
While this categorization is comprehensive, it is complex at the same time, as it
has two levels of categorizations in terms of methods (divided into faces and into soft and
hard power, in which both hard and soft power could be applied in each face). Secondly,
it also based on the rational actor model. For constructivists, for example, international
relations can also be regarded in terms of social relations, and thus states behave not only
based on cost and benefit calculation but also social norms governing interstate relations.
In this sense, those that have the ability to set the norms also have power to influence
others, including in the maritime domain. Indonesia’s success through UNCLOS and US
inability to influence China in the South China Sea are cases in point on the role of norm
as a source of power. Norm as a source of power, or shortly named as normative power,
is different from soft power. Soft power includes both tangible and non-tangible sources,
but they are all attractive source for others, and it is because of this attraction or persuasion
that others follow one’s want. Normative power solely relies on non-tangible source
which might be or might not be attractive to others, but because it is the norms that is
accepted by a group of states or states in general, other state feels to have moral obligation
to follow the norms.
Reflecting on this limitation, this study develops its own version of the three faces
of power to be applied in maritime domain. In principle, the three faces of maritime power
consist of almost similar elements developed by Nye with only additional elements of
normative power and it is much simplified as one face will be related to the dominant
7
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type of power used in each face. Thus, the first face of power refers to the maritime hard
power or the use of coercion at/from the sea to influence others’ behaviour. The second
face of power refers to the maritime soft power or the use of persuasion/attraction at/from
the sea to influence others’ behaviour. The third face of power refers to the maritime
normative power or the use of norm on the sea to make other feel morally obliged to
follow the norms which is in line with one’s norms.
The concept of normative power has never been developed systematically in
studying maritime power. This concept was firstly introduced to describe the position of
the European Union in the current international affairs as it is no longer the biggest
military or economic power in the world (Manners, 2002). The concept of normative
power was thus introduced to describe the role of the EU in international arena which
puts more emphasis on promoting norms for other states that aims to cooperate or be part
of the EU (Manners, 2002). While this concept has not been developed in the study of
maritime power, it is not external to maritime power itself. From Mahan’s elements of
sea power, Mahan included characters of the people and characters of government,
meaning that a country’s norms and attitude toward the maritime domain are keys on the
development of sea power. Till’s sea power output to include maintaining good order at
sea also demonstrates the importance of norms on the sea to influence actors’ behaviour
at the sea. The case of Indonesia and the US mentioned earlier also demonstrate the
exercise and the importance of norms in the maritime domain.
One important thing about the maritime normative power is how it is exercised.
Based on Finemore and Sikkink’s argument, norms spread through several stages before
it is adopted by others, namely emergence, cascade, and internalization (Finnemore &
Sikkink, 1998). Thus, state’s maritime normative power could be seen in each stage of
norm cycle, that is from how state internationalises a new norm until it is internationally
accepted, usually through the help of transnational advocacy network, and how state
socialises this norm to put pressure on the other actors’ behaviour, usually through the
process of emulation, praise, and ridicule or the logic of appropriateness (Finnemore &
Sikkink, 1998, 902).

8
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Table 1. The Three Faces of Maritime Power

Hard Power

Soft Power

Normative Power

Definition

The use of coercion The
use
of The use of norm on the sea to
at/from the sea to persuasion/attraction
make others feel morally
influence
others’ at/from the sea to obliged to follow the norms
influence
others’ which is in line with one’s
behaviour
behaviour
norms

Method

Coercion/force/
command

Agenda
setting/persuasion

Sources

Sanction/punishment/
rewards

Ideology,
culture, Norms
economic advantage

Type

Tangible

Tangible/Non-tangible Non-tangible

Example

Naval forces to secure Infrastructure
International
norms
to
one’s
interest
in assistance to promote influence other in competing
competing maritime maritime cooperation maritime claim
claims

Internationalizing/Socializing
norms

Source: Developed from Nye (2004, 2011)

RESEARCH METHOD
In examining the position of Indonesia in the changing landscape of the Indo Pacific, this
paper will then see which face(s) of maritime power that Indonesia mostly demonstrates
in the Indo Pacific. As it is even still debatable whether Indonesia could be categorised as
a maritime power, this paper will first look at Indonesia’s potential maritime power based
on Mahan’s conception of maritime power. Primary data for this section are collected
mostly from documents of the Indonesian government and analysed through qualitative
method as there are many non-quantifiable elements in Mahan’s sea power concept. The
second section will then examine the actual power that Indonesia has demonstrated in the
changing Indo Pacific based on the faces of maritime power using observation data
between 2014-2019. This period represents the revival of the concept of the Indo Pacific
and Indonesia’s returning to the sea under Jokowi’s presidency. Thus, the section will in
turn discuss Indonesia’s use of the first face of power, the second face of power, and the
third face of power, based on various secondary literatures which will lead to the
conclusion.

9
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DISCUSSION
Indonesia’s Potential Maritime Power
As mentioned earlier, Mahan’s conception of sea power could be treated as the parameter
to see states’ potential as a maritime power. Thus, this section will first examine
Indonesia’s potential maritime power based on Mahan to clarify if Indonesia naturally
could be categorised as a maritime power or if it has the potential to be one.
First of all, in the element of geographical position, Indonesia has an undeniably
favourable geographical position as it is bordered by seas, meaning it has an advantage
for escaping an attack compared to those bordered by land. Indonesia’s maritime domain,
in this context, is three fourths of its total area and it is equal to more than three millions
square kilometres of internal and territorial waters and almost another three millions
square kilometres of EEZ and continental shelf (BPS-Statistics Indonesia, 2017).
Indonesia’s 81,000 km coastline is the second longest in the world after Canada (Perwita,
2004; BPS-Statistics Indonesia, 2017). In addition, Indonesia also fulfils the criterion of
those states located closely to the highway. Indonesia is located in the confluence of the
two oceans which are currently become one of the busiest in the world – the Indo Pacific.
In fact, three important chokepoints in this maritime trade route are in the Indonesian
waters. Indonesia is in short has the first element of maritime power suggested by Mahan.
In the second element – physical conformation, Indonesia has a mixed status.
Indonesia has rich natural production and favourable climate which, according to Mahan,
has pulling effect for people having incentive to go to the sea. The fact that Indonesia has
retreated from the sea under the New Order era for 32 years might be partly explained by
Mahan’s theory on the pulling effect of rich natural production and favourable climate to
people’s incentive to explore the sea. However, if physical conformation is defined
broadly to include the surrounding waters that a state could exploit to advance its sea
power economically, Indonesia with its total 6,315 million km2 of surrounding waters,
has 27.2% of the world’s total flora and fauna species, 19% of the world mangrove forest,
and 14% of the world’s coral reefs (BPS-Statistics Indonesia, 2017). Indonesia is also rich
in fish product and hydrocarbon reserves. In terms of physical conformation, therefore,
Indonesia’s natural production offers rich economic potential for its maritime power,
however, at the same time makes the country more inward looking in its maritime
orientation.
In relations to the third element – the extent of territory – defined as the length of
the coastline, Indonesia with its 99,093 km coastline – the second longest in the world –
10

Global Jurnal Politik Internasional 22(1)

provides great opportunity for its people to interact with the outside world. However, if
we include the second condition, that this extent of territory must be defended by
proportional number of men at least living in the seaboard, Indonesia does not meet this
criterion. Mahan mentioned that the number of sailors, seafaring people and population
must be proportionate to the extent of the sea-coast (Mahan 1987, 22). However,
Indonesia’s village located on the seaboard is only 15,61 percent for the total villages in
Indonesia (BPS-Statistics Indonesia, 2017). It means not only that there is a lack of naval
presence and seafaring people, but also only few of the total population safeguarding
Indonesia’s water. Ports as access to seafront are also not proportional with the extent of
territory. For the 99,093 km coastline, Indonesia only has one port for each 109 km
(Kementerian Perhubungan, 2016). In contrast, Japan has one port for every 34 km
coastline (Pertiwi, 2014; Tim Jalasena, 2012). If the extent of territory is also related to
physical conformation in which Indonesia has the largest number of islands in the world,
the problem is more complex. As Mahan argues, that a state is divided by sea could be a
source of power, but it could also be a source of weakness if it is not well defended. In
this context, that 1,148 of Indonesia’s islands have not been named and 67 of the
outermost islands have no inhabitants demonstrate the lack of government’s attention in
border areas which often become secure places for transnational crimes (BPS-Statistics
Indonesia, 2017). In conclusion, nature has been favourable for Indonesia in terms of the
extent of territory, but human factor as the safeguard is not yet sufficient.
This is more apparent if it is related to the fourth element – the number of
population. Indonesia consists of 255 million people, meaning that Indonesia has a large
number of staying power to defend its territory (BPS-Statistics Indonesia, 2014).
However, the population density is 134 people/km meaning that this staying power is
unevenly distributed across the country (BPS-Statistics, n.d.). This number is even
smaller if we refer to those readily available to defend/to exploit the surrounding waters.
For example, in the fishery sector, only 14,82% Indonesian people are working as
fishermen across the 34 provinces (KKP, n.d.). Indonesia has also 395,500 active military
personnel (IISS, 2016) to defend the total area of almost two million square kilometres
(CIA, n.d.). This proportion is only above the United States, but still lagging compared to
China and India. India has over four million military personnel (IISS, 2016) to defend its
only three million square kilometres of territory (CIA, n.d.). Specifically related to the
navy, the proportion of Indonesian navy to its water area is still lagging from that of Japan
(IISS, 2016). The fourth element, therefore, echoes the preceding element that even
11
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though Indonesia has significant number of population, those readily available for
mobilization on sea remain limited.
As for the characters of the people, Mahan mentioned that it is counted if one
based the definition of sea power on the peaceful and extensive sea commerce, and at this
point, “aptitude for commercial pursuit” or the tendency to trade as seen in the
productivity in relevant sectors could be the indicator, even though of course it is far from
telling the qualities of the people in pursuing this commercial goal. Indonesia ranked 30th
and 40th in the global merchandise and commercial service export respectively (WTO,
2017), and specifically in the maritime sector, Indonesia is among top producer and
exporter of fish and fisheries in the world. In terms of maritime trade, Indonesia is among
the top countries contributing to seafarer serving international commercial vessels and
ranked 20th top ownership of world shipping fleet (UNCTAD, 2019, p. 98). This perhaps
could be a starting point to trace Indonesia’s maritime power based on sea commerce
which seems to play an important role, even though of course it doesn’t tell about the
quality of the people in engaging maritime trade which is acknowledged as the limitation
of this study. The quality of the people in terms of peaceful relations with other countries,
however, could be seen in individual leaders and representatives in dealing with others in
the maritime domain – thus linked to the character of the government.
The character of the government requires supporting government policies toward
maritime development. In this context, Indonesia’s policy has shifted between
administrations. Under President Sukarno, Indonesia’s policy was highly supportive of
its maritime development. In fact, it was under his administration that Indonesia
envisioned to be a global maritime power and proposed an archipelagic status to maintain
the integrity of its separated territory (Kusumaatmadja, 1978). It was Indonesia’s
diplomacy at the UNCLOS that reflected the successful use of normative power for the
first time in the maritime domain. And it was due to this experience, that Indonesia was
selected to lead the process of the establishment of the International Seabed Authority
(ISBA) and the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS) and held the first
presidency of ISBA. However, Indonesia under Sukarno was also known for its
confrontation policy against Malaysia which gave it negative reputation at the
international arena. It was under the following administration that Indonesia rebuilt its
image at the international level through its peaceful approach towards other states.
Indonesia had actively participated and demonstrated its leadership role in various
regional mechanisms, such as in the South China Sea where Indonesia played an honest
12
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broker through its track two initiative and its shuttle diplomacy (BPPK KEMENLU PSSAT UGM, 2015). This peaceful approach at the international level, however, was not
matched by Suharto’s domestic approach which shifted away the focus from maritime to
agriculture. Only recently under Jokowi’s administration that Indonesia began to return
to the sea under the vision of “Global Maritime Fulcrum”. In relations to the last element,
therefore, Indonesia’s approach to maritime development from the government had
changed overtime depending on the domestic political change.
Finally, having discussed all the six elements of sea power according to Mahan in
the case of Indonesia, it can be concluded that Indonesia has supportive natural and human
elements to become a maritime power. Indonesia has favourable geographical position,
extent of territory, number of population, and the character of the people. Only in relations
to natural conformation and supporting human factor that Indonesia still has some works
to be resolved.
Indonesia’s Actual Maritime Power
While Indonesia has great potentials to become a maritime power, its actual power – that
is the power that it exercises or demonstrates to other – might not be similar. This part
will begin to see Indonesia’s actual power in the Indo Pacific using the framework of the
three faces of maritime power.
The First Face of Indonesia’s Maritime Power
The first face of maritime power is the use of coercion at/from the sea to influence others’
behaviour. Hard power is traditionally identified with the threat or the use of military
power, or in this context, the naval power, and thus the discussion will begin by examining
the current stage of Indonesia’s naval power and its use during the period of 2014-2019.
Indonesia’s naval power is directed to meet the Minimum Essential Force (MEF)
required to defend its territory. By 2024, Indonesia will be expected to have 274 naval
vessels consisting of 110 striking vessels, 66 patrol vessels, and 98 supporting vessels,
with an additional of 130 naval aviation (Supriyanto, 2012; Pertiwi, 2014). Judging from
this force structure, Indonesia seems to lean toward developing a defensive rather than
offensive capability. In fact, Indonesia has clearly stated that it targets itself to become a
green water navy by the same year (Kementerian Pertahanan Republik Indonesia, 2014).
Green water navy is the term to describe a state’s naval power that could well operate in
its own jurisdiction of around 100 nm to the next significant land formation (Cole, 2002)
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(Pertiwi, 2014). Its capability is clearly defensive compared to the blue water navy which
has an ability to operate in the open sea without support from the home base. In relations
to the first face of maritime power, therefore, Indonesia seems to not focus on using its
hard power in its maritime affairs. Statistically, this is even more apparent if Indonesia’s
naval power is compared with other maritime powers in the Indo Pacific region. Except
Japan and Australia, most of these powers are blue water navies. Seen from Table 2,
Indonesia’s overall military spending is the smallest among these maritime powers. While
the number of its active naval personnel is slightly above India and Japan, Indonesia has
much larger maritime territory than these two countries, and thus it is still lagging in terms
of the proportion of personnel versus territory. Therefore, not only Indonesia’s naval
power has not met the minimum required forces, but it is also still lagging compared to
other maritime powers in the Indo Pacific.

Table 2. The Comparison of the First Face of Maritime Powers in 2016
Components of Naval Power
I.

Military Spending ($m)

II. Personnel

IDN

IND

JPN

PRC

AUS

US

7,385

56,638

46,471

216,031

26,383

600,106

65,000

58,350

45,500

200,000

13,550

323,600

III. Force Structure
1.

Submarines

2

14

18

61

6

71

2.

Principal
Surface
Combatant
a. Frigates

11

28

47

74

11

98

11

13

9

54

11

4

0

2

3

1

10

13

33

19

62

3.

4.

b.

Air Craft Carrier

c.

Destroyer

d.

Cruiser

Patrol
&
Combatant

2
Coastal

88

109

a.

Corvette

21

24

b.

Mine Warfare

11

6

c.

Command Ship

d.

Amphibious

Logistics and support

6

22
199+

15

57

6

11

22
27

49

2
81

42

11

123

19

275

57

28

171

37

71

Source: Data for military spending (SIPRI, n.d.), data for personnel and force structure (IISS,
2016)
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Historical records also reaffirm this tendency. Except Confrontation against
Malaysia in 1963, Indonesia never uses its military to resolve interstate conflicts. Dispute
with Malaysia over Ambalat indeed led to rising tension between the two militaries, but
in the end, the countries always resort to diplomatic tools to resolve the problem. This
trend continues during the observed period between 2014-2019 amid the rise of the Indo
Pacific region. Indonesia has firmly challenged the existing conception of the IndoPacific as a new front for power rivalry and instead proposed to establish the Indo-Pacific
as a new arena for cooperation with ASEAN in its centrality and East Asian Summit as
its main venue (KSP, 2018). Indonesia’s approach at this point is far from aggressive and
militaristic.
Similar with the case of the South China Sea. Indonesia continues to play its role
as an honest broker in the dispute meaning that it plays active role in facilitating dialogue
among claimant countries but at the same also strengthened its military presence in the
Natuna islands which are directly bordered by the South China Sea. During the observed
period, the most significant development was the defensive measures taken against
Chinese illegal fishing in 2016. This is, however, only minor compared to Indonesia’s
overall strategy in the South China Sea and compared to those adopted by other powers.
India, Japan, and the US conduct routine naval exercise annually both in the West Pacific
and the Indian Ocean under the umbrella of MALABAR exercise. In addition, the US
alone also has routine FONOPs or Freedom of Navigation Operations which have been
conducted six times under Obama and another six times under Trump (Storey, 2018).
Moreover, China as the claimant state who not only conducts routine patrol but has
continuously built up artificial islands together with its military installation in the seven
disputed features in the South China Sea. Seen from the practice during 2014-2019,
therefore, Indonesia continues its traditional approach of avoiding the use of its hard
power.

The Second Face of Maritime Power
Indonesia’s reluctance to use its hard power does not mean that it excels in its soft power.
The maritime soft power is the use of persuasion/attraction at/from the sea to influence
others’ behaviour. This may include maritime economic attraction in the forms of
maritime resources and maritime trade, maritime development assistance, maritime
diplomacy, and naval diplomacy. Comparison between Indonesia, China, Japan, India,
Australia and the United States in some aspects of these sectors can be seen in Table 3.
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In terms of maritime economic attraction, Indonesia as described earlier has rich marine
biodiversity, fisheries, and hydrocarbon. Compared to other countries, Indonesia ranks
second after China in terms of fish production and third after China and the US in terms
of fish trade. In the broader maritime trade, however, Indonesia shares the least
merchandise trade and second least share of the world fleet ownership or only above
Australia which because its rank below the world top 35 fleet ownership, the data is not
available. Even so, it is also not clear if and how far Indonesia takes advantage of its
maritime resource attraction to influence others in the Indo Pacific. Indonesia successfully
led the Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA) as a socio-economic cooperation among
countries in the Indian Ocean Rim between 2015-2017 and in 2017, it also initiated the
Archipelagic Island States (AIS) Forum, more as an environmental cooperation among
archipelagic states. Yet, it is unclear how and how far Indonesia uses its maritime
economic attraction and its maritime diplomacy to influence other in both organizations.

Table 3. Sources of Maritime Soft Power

IDN

IND

JPN

PRC

AUS

US

Fish production

11492

10762

3872

66808

269

5364

Fish trade

1280

1072

681

7652

89

1892

Share of world Fleet 1.14
ownership (2019)

1.27

11.47

10.51

N/A*

2.97

Share of world 0.9
merchandise trade
(2018)

1.7

3.8

12.8

1.3

8.5

Marine Resource

Maritime Trade

Source: (UNCTAD, 2019; WTO, 2019; FAO, 2018)

Indonesia’s lack of maritime soft power is more apparent in the maritime
development assistance. Indonesia still positions itself as a recipient rather than donor.
This is different from China who is currently the biggest donor of maritime development
assistance in the region through its Maritime Silk Road Initiatives (Panda, 2018).
Responding to this, Japan also boosted its development assistance including for those
areas prone to the breeding of sea pirates. In addition to the already established maritime
security cooperation with ASEAN in anti-piracy measure, Japan also offers technical
assistance for developing coastguard in individual ASEAN countries amid the growing
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role of Chinese coastguard in the region (Honna, 2014). The United States also allocated
$119 million assistance in 2015 for maritime capacity building in Southeast Asia (US
Embassy & Consulates in Indonesia, n.d.). Australia also continues to offer capacity
building assistance with individual regional states or collectively, such as the capacity
building through Exercise Kakadu. Meanwhile India demonstrates its presence through
training, capacity building and investment in regional states’ infrastructure, including the
deep-sea port in Indonesia and port infrastructure in Myanmar (Upadhyaya, 2018)
(Chaudhury, 2019). These various kinds of foreign assistance are important tools through
which major powers compete for their influence in the Indo Pacific. In fact, many accused
that it was the dominant Chinese aid in Cambodia that led to Cambodia’s position of
supporting China in ASEAN in 2012 when Cambodia rejected to include the South China
Sea dispute in the joint communique and in 2016 when Cambodia rejected to mention the
decision of the Permanent Court of Arbitration also in an ASEAN joint communique
(Thayer, 2012; Pertiwi, 2016; The Japan Times, 2019).
Last but not least, it is also important to take a look at naval diplomacy as a source
of maritime soft power. It must be noted that naval diplomacy can serve as a source of
hard power if it emphasises the coercive function, soft power if it emphasises the image
building, coalition building, and persuasion or attraction, and even normative power if it
emphasises the socialisation of norms. Thus, as soft power, naval diplomacy influences
the behaviour of others through the advantage that it offers in the programs, for example,
training, capacity building and information sharing. In this sense, all countries under
discussion have their own naval exercise programs. Australia has exercise Kakadu which
also includes capacity building for the 27 participating countries in 2018 (Royal
Australian Navy, n.d.). India has Milan which includes information sharing for its 16
participating countries in 2018 (Indian Navy, n.d.). Perhaps the most significant soft
power competition could be seen between China and the United States who both
conducted their own multilateral naval exercise with ASEAN countries in 2019. China
conducted its naval exercise with six ASEAN countries in April 2019 while the US began
its first ASEAN-US Maritime Exercise (AUMX) in September (Chan, 2019; Kapur,
2019). Interestingly, Indonesia also has its own naval diplomacy as mandated by Law No.
35, 2005 (Sirmareza, 2017) in the form of Exercise Komodo, and it had the biggest
number of participating countries (34 countries) compared to the previously mentioned
which perhaps could be explained by Indonesia’s successful image building as more
neutral in the power rivalry in the Indo Pacific (Parameswaran, 2018).
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The Third Face of Maritime Power
The last face of maritime power is the use of norm on the sea to make other feel morally
obliged to follow the norms which is in line with one’s norms. This is perhaps the last
aspect that many expect Indonesia to have comparative advantage compared to the others.
After all, Indonesia’s past experiences have demonstrated its normative power at the
UNCLOS process and other regional maritime arrangements. In the South China Sea,
Indonesia has promoted ‘peaceful solution’ to the conflict as early as in the 1990 when it
first initiated Track Two Diplomacy (later became Track 1.5) on managing potential
conflicts in the South China Sea which is still conducted regularly up to present
(Luhulima, 2007; Kartika, 2019). The workshop itself led to the ASEAN Declaration on
the South China Sea in 1992 which then evolved into the Declaration on the Conduct of
Parties in the South China (DoC) in 2002, and is currently in its final negotiation to
become a Code of Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea (CoC), which Indonesia
actively participates in (Kusumasomantri, 2015, p.64). Indonesia’s promoted norm of
‘peaceful solution’ and ‘ASEAN unity’ to the dispute resonate well, consistent, and is
accepted by all parties in the dispute. Indonesia has also demonstrated its effort in
safeguarding this norm as apparent in its shuttle diplomacy when ASEAN was in danger
of failing from issuing joint statement on the dispute and brought back all members on
the same front for the dispute. In the recent negotiation with China on the Code of
Conduct, Indonesia also took the initiative to ensure all ASEAN members had similar
position on the matter and bridged ASEAN discussion with China (Kusumasomantri,
2015).
This is rather different from China’s promoted norm of ‘bilateralism’ which has
been challenged overtly by other claimants and other regional actors such as Japan and
the United States. Other claimants have consistently rejected dealing with China
bilaterally. Also, when China still valued bilateralism more than international law in the
form of the PCA rulings, ASEAN member states called for respect for the rulings. In this
context, the US’s approach to the dispute is no more accepted than that offered by China.
So far, the US has mainly promoted the norm of ‘freedom of navigation’ that must be
respected in the dispute. However, while US allies such as Japan, Australia, and India,
support this norm and no other countries have challenged this norm verbally, this norm is
not well respected. China’s continuous island build up and its strong critics to the US as
non-party to the UNCLOS talking freedom of navigation are only few among similar
critics to the US. In this normative approach, therefore, Indonesia’s normative power is
18

Global Jurnal Politik Internasional 22(1)

more influential and accepted compared to others. In the 1.5 track diplomacy under the
workshop of Managing Potential Conflicts in the South China Sea, Indonesia even
succeeded in bringing China and Taiwan in the same table and implementing the same
project (BPPK KEMENLU - PSSAT UGM, 2015). Even though the workshop dealt with
low political issues, it demonstrates others’ approval on Indonesia’s peaceful and
cooperative approach to the dispute.
This is also the case with naval diplomacy mentioned earlier. Naval diplomacy
can also be used as a normative power when it is used to promote certain norms or to
pressure others to follow certain norms. The US and Australia’s naval exercises have this
element, that is to support the norms of freedom of navigation. Australia’s Exercise
Kakadu was also participated by China for the first time in 2018 and thus a useful tool to
socialize this norm (Smith, 2018). Yet, China’s behaviour in the South China Sea shows
that this norm has not yet well adopted by China. On the other hand, China has
consistently participated in Indonesia’s Exercise Komodo which puts less emphasis on
the freedom of navigation but more on humanitarian action which is more comfortable
for China (China Military, 2018). Indonesia’s approach to invite many participants not
only demonstrates its successful image building as a neutral party in the Indo Pacific but
also a consistent promoter of the norm of open and inclusive Indo Pacific. In the discourse
of the Indo Pacific, Indonesia has been leading in promoting ASEAN’s outlook on the
Indo Pacific to be an open and inclusive region focusing on maritime, economic,
connectivity, and SDGs cooperation (Kemlu, 2019). This normative role is important
amid the heightened contestation in the region between China and the Quad as it helps
demonstrating not only the existence but also the active role of ASEAN in managing its
own region in this changing landscape. Indonesia’s vision, in this sense, is also more
acceptable for the members of the region compared to the other visions of the newly IndoPacific.

CONCLUSION
The question of Indonesia’s position in comparison to other maritime powers in the
changing landscape of the Indo Pacific is a simple question which requires complex
analysis. Study must be conducted to redefine the currently underdeveloped concept of
maritime power as the key concept used in this study. Even after the redefinition of the
concept, the application of the concept requires broad analysis across the three faces of
maritime power, both to examine Indonesia’s absolute maritime power and its relative
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power compared to the other. Answers offered in this study serve more as the beginning
for further analysis which is not feasibly conducted in this short essay. Provisional
conclusion that could be drawn at this point from the selected cases and observation
during 2014-2019 is that Indonesia has potential maritime power and has demonstrated
its actual power during the observed period. However, Indonesia demonstrates more of
its normative power, less on its soft power, and least on its hard power. Brought to the
larger context, the case of Indonesia demonstrates that regional power is not only takers
or spectators in the Indo Pacific region. They have agency role even though subtle as they
make use of their normative – intangible power, rather than tangible sources such as
military or economic power.
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